Evaluating life or death prospects by Bovens, Luc & Fleurbaey, Marc
  
Luc Bovens and Marc Fleurbaey 
Evaluating life or death prospects 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Bovens, Luc and Fleurbaey, Marc (2012) Evaluating life or death prospects. Economics and 
Philosophy, 28 (02). pp. 217-249. ISSN 0266-2671  
 
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267112000235 
 
© 2012 Cambridge University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46190/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2014 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
Economics and Philosophy
http://journals.cambridge.org/EAP
Additional services for Economics and
Philosophy:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
EVALUATING LIFE OR DEATH PROSPECTS
Luc Bovens and Marc Fleurbaey
Economics and Philosophy / Volume 28 / Special Issue 02 / July 2012, pp 217 - 249
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267112000235, Published online: 29 August 2012
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0266267112000235
How to cite this article:
Luc Bovens and Marc Fleurbaey (2012). EVALUATING LIFE OR DEATH
PROSPECTS. Economics and Philosophy, 28, pp 217-249 doi:10.1017/
S0266267112000235
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/EAP, IP address: 158.143.197.122 on 27 Jan 2014
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Jan 2014 IP address: 158.143.197.122
Economics and Philosophy, 28 (2012) 217–249 Copyright C© Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0266267112000235
EVALUATING LIFE OR DEATH
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mfleurba@princeton.edu
We consider a special set of risky prospects in which the outcomes
are either life or death (or, more generally, binary utilities). There are
various alternatives to the utilitarian objective of minimizing the expected
loss of lives in such prospects. We start off with the two-person case
with independent risks and construct taxonomies of ex ante and ex post
evaluations for such prospects. We examine the relationship between the ex
ante and the ex post in this restrictive framework: There are more possibilities
to respect ex ante and ex post objectives simultaneously than in the general
framework, i.e. without the restriction to binary utilities (cf. Harsanyi’s
aggregation theorem). We extend our results to n persons and to dependent
risks. We study optimal strategies for allocating risk reductions given
different objectives. We place our results against the backdrop of various pro-
poorly off (or prioritarian) value functions (Diamond 1967; Rabinowicz 2002;
Fleurbaey 2010) for the evaluation of risky prospects.
We are grateful to comments from Wlodek Rabinowicz, Martin van Hees and Alex
Voorhoeve. Luc Bovens is grateful for the support of the Swedish Collegium for Advanced
Studies (SCAS) in Uppsala, Sweden, the Grantham Research Institute on Climate and the
Environment and the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, which is funded
by the Economic and Social Research Council, and the Dutch Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO – project nr. 236-20-005).
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1. INTRODUCTION
We investigate a special set of prospects, viz. prospects in which utilities
are two-valued. One natural interpretation of such prospects is that they
represent social actions in which people may either live or die.1 One
may think of public works, strategies on the battle field, public health
policies, medical triage etc. A policy analyst is charged with ordering sets
of such prospects. She may have various objectives and orderings will
differ depending on these objectives.
What kind of objectives might an analyst have? Clearly, she might
aim to minimize the expected loss of human lives. But this is not all that
an analyst typically cares about. Consider the following two alternative
objectives. First, when evaluating two public works, she may want to
avoid a public works in which the risks are highly focused on a few
people and opt instead for a public works in which they are more evenly
distributed. Second, in evaluating military strategies, she may want to
maximize the chance that all of the forces or some strategically important
portion of the forces will survive. As we will see, the former objective is
one type of ex ante objective and the latter is one type of ex post objective.
We will construct a taxonomy which captures such objectives in a
systematic way and spells out the interrelations between them. Some of
these objectives will lead to exactly the same orderings. Some will lead to
orderings that are only marginally different. Others will lead to radically
different orderings. We do not defend one particular normative stance
here, but it is important to understand the synergies and tensions that
are present in the space of normative possibilities.
The analyst’s objectives affect how she will invest available resources
in reducing the risks given the available technology. Should she focus all
her resources on reducing the risk to one person or should she spread
them and reduce the risks to multiple people? Should she aim to bring
about greater risk reductions or should she focus her resources foremost
on reducing the risk to people who are at higher risk (even if she could
reduce the risk of people at lower risk to a greater extent)? We show how
different objectives determine different risk reduction strategies.
We start from a simple two-person model with independent risks
(section 2), model ex ante objectives (section 3) and ex post objectives
(section 5), and investigate investment decisions in risk reduction (section
4). We then study the relationship between ex ante and ex post objectives
(section 6). We extend the model to correlated and anti-correlated risks
(section 7) and to the n-person case (section 8). We show how our work
relates to Keeney’s seminal paper on equity and risk reduction (1980)
1 One might also think of other interpretations, e.g. admission policies with uncertain binary
outcomes such as success or failure in the programme of study.
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(section 6), to Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem (sections 6.6 and 9.1), and
to conflicting models of prioritarianism in Diamond (1967), Rabinowicz
(2002) and Fleurbaey (2010) (section 9).
2. A TWO-PERSON MODEL, INDEPENDENT RISKS AND DIFFERENT
OBJECTIVES
Let pi be the chance of a fatality for person i and assume that fatality
chances are independent. Then we can represent a life or death prospect
as a vector of fatality chances <p1, p2>. The challenge of evaluating such
prospects is to construct an ordering over the set {<p1, p2>|<p1, p2> ∈ [0,
1] × [0, 1]}.
We will distinguish between two types of analysts. An ex ante analyst
considers the value of the prospect to be determined by the expected
utilities of the people affected. We set the utility for person i at ui = 1
if i survives and at ui = 0 if i incurs a fatality. Then the expected utility
E[ui] of the prospect for person i is (1 − pi) = 0pi + 1(1 − pi), i.e. her
survival chance. An ex post analyst considers the value of the prospect
to be determined by the expectation of the social utility of the state of
the world that is actualized. The social utility of the state is 0 if 0 people
survive, 1 if both people survive and β if exactly 1 person survives, with
0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Suppose that an ex ante analyst can improve the expected utility
(i.e. the survival chance) of a person with a small amount ε. Then her
objectives may align with the following priorities:
(i) Improving survival chances (for a person) at a lower survival-chance
level matters infinitely more to her than doing so (for a person) at a
higher survival-chance level (maximin);
(ii) Improving survival chances at a lower survival-chance level matters
somewhat more to her than doing so at a higher survival-chance
level (prioritarian);
(iii) Improving survival chances at a lower survival-chance level matters
equally to her as doing so at a higher survival-chance level
(utilitarian);
(iv) Improving survival chances at a higher survival-chance level matters
somewhat more to her than doing so at a lower survival-chance level
(anti-prioritarian).
(v) Improving survival chances at a higher survival-chance level matters
infinitely more to her than doing so at a lower survival-chance level
(maximax).
An ex post analyst may also have different objectives:
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(i) All that matters to her is that both survive (omnitarian);
(ii) The survival of one (or the other) matters little to her, whereas the
survival of both matters much to her (majoritarian);
(iii) The survival of each additional person matters equally to her
(paritarian);
(iv) The survival of one (or the other) person matters very much to her
and the survival of an additional person is of little concern to her
(minoritarian);
(v) All that matters to her is that at least one survives (unitarian).
What orderings over {<p1, p2>|<p1, p2>∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]} do these objectives
generate? Are some of these objectives functionally equivalent in that
they generate the same orderings? And how do they affect investment
decisions?
3. EX ANTE EVALUATIONS
For an ex ante analyst, the value v of a prospect is a function of E[u1] and
E[u2]. As we saw before,
E[ui ] = (1 − pi ) for i = 1, 2(3.1)
i.e. i’s survival chance. To differentiate between the various ex ante
objectives, we construct a transform ϕα of the expected utility E[ui]. Let
us first define the ϕα function:
ϕα(E[ui ]) = 1
/
(1 − α)
(
(E[ui ])(1−α) − 1
)
if α ≥ 0, α = 1;(3.2)
−1/(1 + α)((1 − E[ui ])(1+α) − 1) if α < 0, α = −1;
lim
α→1
[1/
(1 − α)
(
(E[ui ])(1−α) − 1
)] = ln(E[ui ]) if α = 1;
lim
α→−1
[
−1/(1 + α)((1 − E[ui ])(1+α) − 1)] = − ln(1 − E[ui ])
if α = −1.
There are two questions. What does the function in (3.2) do for us in
modelling ex ante objectives? And why did we choose this function rather
than some other function? We will take up the first question here and
address the second question towards the end of this section.
These transforms indicate the importance that the analyst assigns to
an ε change (i.e. an infinitesimal increment) in the expected utility for
a person at lower fatality chances relative to the importance of such a
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FIGURE 1. Linear transforms of ϕα as a function of the fatality chance p. The
parameters for the linear transforms are chosen so that ϕα(pi = 0) = 0 and
ϕα(pi = 1) = 1.
change at higher fatality chances. To see this, we have plotted ϕα as a
function of pi for various values of α in Figure 1.2
For α ∈ (0, ∞), note that an ε change at high fatality chance matters
more than at low fatality chance, i.e. ϕα(pi + ε) − ϕα(pi) is larger for higher
values of pi than for lower values of pi. This is the prioritarian objective,
i.e. the ex ante objective (ii) in section 2. Similarly, α = 0 maps onto the
utilitarian objective; α∈ (− ∞, 0) maps onto the anti-prioritarian objective.
As α goes to ∞, we have the maximin objective and, as α goes to − ∞, we
have the maximax objective.
The value of a prospect is the sum of ϕα transforms of people’s
expected utilities:
vα(<p1, p2>) =
∑
i=1,2
ϕα(E[ui ])(3.3)
We construct an ordering over {<p1, p2>|<p1, p2> ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]} for a
given α:
<p∗1, p
∗
2> α <p
#
1, p
#
2> ⇔ vα(<p∗1, p∗2>) ≥ vα(<p#1, p#2>)(3.4)
2 Or more accurately, we have plotted positive linear transformations of ϕα – this makes no
difference, since positive linear transformations produce the same orderings.
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= −1 = 1 = 0
= −
FIGURE 2. Technology with risk reductions imposed on five ex ante evaluations.
The analyst will implement the risk reduction indicated by the full-line arrow
(rather than the dashed arrows).
and represent the orderings for different values of α by means of contour
plots in Figure 2. (Ignore the arrows in Figure 2 for now.) Note how for
α = −1 (an instance of anti-prioritarianism), the contour lines are convex
to the origin; For α = 1 (an instance of prioritarianism), the contour lines
are concave to the origin; For α = 0 (utilitarianism), the contour lines are
diagonals; For α approaching − ∞ (maximax), the contour lines become
angular towards the origin; For α approaching ∞ (maximin), the contour
lines become angular away from the origin.
These contour plots represent the orderings of analysts whose
objectives are characterized by particular αs. For example, a prioritarian
with α = 1 is more willing to make trade-offs that favour higher fatality
chances rather than lower fatality chances. To see this, look at the points
S∗ and S# in Figure 3. Both points are on the same contour line, i.e. the
analyst is indifferent between them. Note how the analyst is willing to
incur a huge increase δ in fatality chance for person 2 (who is at low fatality
chance) to secure a small decrease ε in fatality chance for person 1 (who
is at high fatality chance). It is in this respect that prioritarianism favours
people at high fatality chance.
Similarly, the contour plots show that anti-prioritarianism (e.g. α = − 1)
favours people at low fatality chance; that maximax (α → − ∞) only cares
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FIGURE 3. Contour plots for vα(<p1, p2>) =
∑
i=1,2 ϕα(E[ui ]) for α = 1.
about the person who has the higher survival chance; that maximin (α →
∞) only cares about the person who has the lower survival chance; and
that utilitarianism (α = 0) does not care who is at lower or higher survival
chance – a utilitarian analyst is indifferent between two prospects if an
increase in one person’s survival chance is offset by a decrease of the same
size in the other person’s survival chance.
Let us now turn to the second question: Why did we choose the
function in (3.2)? For α ≥ 0, a variant of this function is commonly used
in a particular social welfare function. We find a presentation in Atkinson
(1970: 251). Let yi be the income level of each person in a society.
(3.5) ϕα(yi ) = 1
/
(1 − α)y(1−α)i if α ≥ 0, α = 1;
ln(yi ) if α = 1
The social welfare function is the sum of the ϕα(yi)s for all persons i. α
is a measure of inequality aversion. One income distribution is weakly
preferred to another if the social welfare function for the former yields a
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Jan 2014 IP address: 158.143.197.122
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value that weakly exceeds the value of the social welfare function for the
latter.
This social welfare function has a number of attractive properties. One
such property is that it generates orderings over income distributions that
satisfy the Pigou–Dalton condition, i.e. if we take a fixed sum away from
a higher-income person and transfer it to a lower-income person without
thereby changing their relative rank, then this transfer should yield a
distribution that is weakly preferred to the original distribution.3
For α ≥ 0, our function in (3.2) is a linear transformation of Atkinson’s
function in (3.5) substituting expected utilities (or survival chances) for
income levels. Also here, α is a measure of inequality aversion and the
Pigou–Dalton condition in our framework says that if we reduce survival
chances with ε for a person at a higher survival chance level at the
benefit of increasing survival chances with ε for a person at a lower
survival chance level without thereby changing their relative rank, then
the distribution that we arrive at is weakly preferred to the original one.
Admittedly, there is a whole class of functions that satisfy the Pigou–
Dalton condition. So what is the attraction of choosing this one? By
choosing this function, (i) we no longer need to stipulate that ϕα is the
logarithm for α = 1, but rather it can be shown that the value of ϕα equals
the logarithm in the limit with α approaching 1, and, as we will see, (ii)
we can identify a particular ex ante evaluation (viz. with α = 1) that yields
precisely the same ordering as the (ex post) omnitarian evaluation.
For α < 0, the function satisfies an ‘anti-Pigou–Dalton’ condition, viz.
if we increase survival chances with ε for a person at a higher survival
chance level at the cost of decreasing survival chances with ε for a person
at a lower survival chance level, then the distribution that we arrive at
is preferred to the original one. Again, there is a whole class of functions
that satisfies this anti-Pigou–Dalton condition. But we have chosen the
function in (3.2) because (i) it yields mirror image contour plots for α and
– α, (ii) it can be shown to equal a logarithmic function in the limit with
α approaching −1, and, as we will see, (iii) there is a particular ex ante
evaluation (viz. with α = −1) that yields precisely the same orderings as
the (ex post) unitarian evaluation.4
3 An extensive discussion and defence of this social welfare function can be found in
Adler (2011: 307–404), with references to Boadway and Bruce (1984: 159–160), Bossert and
Weymark (2004: 1159–1164) and Roberts (1980).
4 In the context of inequality measures for income distributions, Atkinson’s function in (3.5)
has the additional property that it is scale invariant. This is arguably a welcome property,
since, one might say, it should not affect an inequality ordering whether incomes are
measured in, say, francs or in euros. But scale invariance is not a motivation for our function
in (3.2). For one thing, for α ≥ 0, there is scale invariance in survival chances, whereas for
α < 0, there is scale invariance in fatality chances. Now rather than taking scale invariance
as a motivating property, it is interesting that one ex ante–ex post equivalence entails scale
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FIGURE 4. Technology determining the possibility set for risk reduction
4. TECHNOLOGY
We bring in the technology in Figure 4. Suppose that we start from a
prospect <p1, p2>, represented by the tails of the arrows. We have a
budget for risk reductions. If we focus all of our resources on person 1
we can reduce the risk for her with δ. If we focus all of our resources
on person 2 we can reduce the risk for him with ε. Or we can choose
any linear combination of these risk reductions. The possibility set is the
triangle defined by the points <p1, p2>, <p1−δ, p2> and <p1, p2−ε>. The
thick line is the Pareto frontier of the possibility set. The full-line arrows
represent corner solutions, i.e. risk reductions that are fully focused on one
person. The dashed arrow points to an interior solution, i.e. a risk reduction
in which the resources are divided between the two people.
Return to Figure 2. We want to move to the point on the Pareto frontier
at which vα is maximal. This means that we are moving from the northeast
(in which fatality chances are higher) to the southwest (in which fatality
invariance in survival chances, whereas another ex ante–ex post equivalence entails scale
invariance in fatality chances.
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chances are lower) and choose an arrow so that its head is in an area
in which vα is maximal – i.e. the shading in the contour plot is lightest.
We track the risk reductions for five ex ante evaluations in Figure 2. The
full arrows represent the risk reduction that is chosen, the dashed arrows
represent risk reductions that are not chosen.
For an anti-prioritarian (α = −1), the solution is a corner solution.
Furthermore, the analyst is more inclined to favour people at low risk, i.e.
she tends to favour a smaller risk reduction for a low-risk person over
a greater risk reduction for a high-risk person. (Note how she favours
person 2 over person 1 in Figure 2 with α = −1.)
For a prioritarian (α = 1), the solution may be a corner solution or an
interior solution. Furthermore, the analyst favours people at high risk, i.e.
she prefers to shift the bulk of the risk reduction towards the person at
high risk. (Note how she favours person 1 over person 2 in Figure 2 with
α = 1.)
For a utilitarian (α = 0), if δ = ε, any solution on the Pareto frontier
is open; if δ = ε, the solution is a corner solution and the greatest risk
reduction will be implemented, i.e. <p1 − δ, p2> if δ > ε and <p1, p2 − ε>
if ε > δ. (Note how the analyst chooses the greater risk reduction in
Figure 2 with α = 0.)
For a maximaxer (α → − ∞), the solution is the corner solution
that contains maximal higher survival chance (i.e. minimal lower fatality
chance) of the points <p1 − δ, p2> and <p1, p2 − ε>. (Note how the head
of the vertical arrow contains minimal lower fatality chance in Figure 2
with α → − ∞.)
For a maximiner (α → ∞), if the Pareto frontier crosses the diagonal
(with p1 = p2) then the solution is an interior solution, viz. the point at
which p1 = p2; If it does not cross the diagonal, then the solution is the
corner solution that affords maximal lower survival chance (i.e. minimal
higher fatality chance). (Note the equal fatality chances solution and the
solution at the end of the horizontal arrow with the minimal higher fatality
chance for person 1 in Figure 2 with α → ∞.)
In summary, as we move from the maximax over anti-prioritarianism
to utilitarianism, solutions tend to be corner solutions and we tend to
move away from favouring higher survival chances towards aiming
for maximal risk reductions. As we move from utilitarianism over
prioritarianism to the maximin, possibilities of interior solutions open up
and we move away from aiming for maximal risk reduction towards
favouring lower survival chances, which yields greater risk equity.
5. EX POST EVALUATIONS
The ex post analyst attaches utilities to states. There are four possible states,
viz. (i) all die (i.e. S0), (ii) person 1 survives and person 2 dies, (iii) person 1
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Jan 2014 IP address: 158.143.197.122
EVALUATING LIFE OR DEATH PROSPECTS 227
U(Si) Omnitarian Majoritarian Paritarian Minoritarian Unitarian 
S2 All survive 
 
1 1 1 1 1 
S1 Exactly 1 
survives 
0 (0, .5) .5 (.5, 1) 1 
S0 All die  0 0 0 0 0 
TABLE 1. Ex post utility functions for omnitarians, majoritarians, paritarians,
minoritarians and unitarians
dies and person 2 survives and (iv) all survive (i.e. S2). Let us assume
anonymity, i.e. the analyst does not favour one person over the other.
Hence the states (ii) and (iii) are of equal value to her and we can represent
their disjunction as S1. Then we can capture all the different types of ex post
analysts in Table 1.
Remember that the utility of exactly one person surviving U(S1)
equals β. So for the ex post analyst, the value vβ of the public works is
vβ(<p1, p2>) = E[U(Si )] =
∑
i=0,1,2
P(Si )U(Si )(5.1)
= 0P(S0) + β P(S1) + 1P(S2)
= β P(S1) + P(S2)
Assuming independence between fatality events:
P(S1) = p1(1 − p2) + (1 − p1)p2(5.2)
P(S2) = (1 − p1)(1 − p2)(5.3)
We construct an ordering over {<p1, p2>|<p1, p2>∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]} for a
given β:
<p∗1, p
∗
2> β <p
#
1, p
#
2>⇔ vβ(<p∗1, p∗2>) ≥ vβ(<p#1, p#2>)(5.4)
How this ordering behaves for values of β ∈ [0, 1] will become clear when
we compare the orderings for a and β in the next section.
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6. COMPARING EX ANTE AND EX POST EVALUATIONS
6.1 Three shared rankings
The following three equivalences hold.5 The (ex ante) utilitarian and (ex
post) paritarian analyst share the same ranking:
<p∗1, p
∗
2> α=0 <p
#
1, p
#
2>⇔<p∗1, p∗2> β=.5 <p#1, p#2>(6.1.1)
Furthermore, there is a particular (ex ante) prioritarian who shares the same
ranking with the (ex post) omnitarian:
<p∗1, p
∗
2> α=1 <p
#
1, p
#
2>⇔<p∗1, p∗2> β=0 <p#1, p#2>(6.1.2)
And finally, there is a particular (ex ante) anti-prioritarian who shares the
same ranking with the (ex post) unitarian:
<p∗1, p
∗
2> α=−1 <p
#
1, p
#
2>⇔<p∗1, p∗2> β=1 <p#1, p#2>(6.1.3)
How can we interpret these equivalences? (6.1.1) states that an ex ante
analyst who is indifferent between making ε reductions at high or low
fatality chances will construct the same ranking as an ex post analyst who
values the survival of each additional person equally. So the contour plots
for the utilitarian and the paritarian analysts are the same. According to
(6.1.2), the ranking of an ex ante analyst who favours ε reductions at high
fatality chances to a particular degree coincides with that of an ex post
analyst who only cares about the survival of all. The last equivalence,
(6.1.3), expresses that an ex ante analyst who favours ε reductions at low
fatality chances to a particular degree will have the same ranking as an ex
post analyst who only cares about the survival of at least one.
In Table 2, we have juxtaposed ex ante and ex post positions
and have introduced some additional terms. We have constructed a
continuum of weak, moderate and extreme (anti)-prioritarianism. Moderate
prioritarianism maps onto omnitarianism (6.1.2) and anti-prioritarianism
maps onto unitarianism (6.1.3). Utilitarianism maps onto paritarianism
(6.1.1). We have also introduced ex post maximin and maximax labels, which
we discuss in section 6.4. This table invites a number of observations
which we will discuss in the remainder of this section.
5 Note that the vα and vβ functions that determine the rankings in (6.1.1) are order-
preserving (and similarly in (6.1.2) and in (6.1.3)): for (6.1.1), vβ = .5(<p1, p2>) = .5(p1
(1−p2) + (1−p1) p2) + (1−p1)(1−p2) = 1−.5p1−.5p2 and vα = 0(<p1, p2>) = (1−p1) +
(1−p2) = 2(1−.5p1 – .5p2); for (6.1.2), vβ = 0(<p1, p2>) = (1−p1)(1−p2) and vα = 1(<p1,
p2>) = ln(1−p1) + ln(1−p2) = ln((1−p1)(1−p2)); and for (6.1.3), vβ = 1(<p1, p2>) =
p1(1−p2) + (1−p1) p2 + (1−p1)(1−p2) = 1−p1p2 and vα = –1(<p1, p2>) = −ln(p1)−ln(p2) =
−ln(p1p2).
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Ex Ante  Ex Post 
 α   
Maximax 
Extreme Anti-Priorism 
 – ∞    
Strong Anti-Priorism –  (  ∞, – 1)    
Moderate Anti-Priorism – 1  1 Unitarian
Maximax
 
Weak Anti-Priorism (– 1, 0)  (.5, 1) Minoritarian 
Utilitarian 0  .5 Paritarian 
Weak Priorism (0, 1)  (0, .5) Majoritarian 
Moderate Priorism 1  0 Omnitarian
Maximin 
Strong Prior ism (1, ∞)    
Maximin 
Extreme Prior ism
∞    
β
TABLE 2. Ex ante and ex post positions
6.2 Keeney on risk equity and catastrophe avoidance
There is a connection between our work and Keeney’s work (1980).
Keeney shows that there is a conflict between the goal of risk equity, i.e.
the goal of distributing risk equally between individuals, and the goal
of catastrophe avoidance, i.e. minimizing the risk that a large number of
individuals will be hit. Indeed, the best way to avoid a catastrophe is to
concentrate the risk on a few individuals, but this sacrifice of a small group
is anti-egalitarian.
The same point comes out in our analysis. In Table 2, focus on the row
indicating the identity of the value functions of unitarians and moderate
anti-prioritarians. If all we care about is to avoid the catastrophe of both
dying, then we are ex post analysts with β = 1, i.e. unitarians. Unitarians
order prospects in the same way as the ex ante analyst with α = −1,
i.e. the moderate anti-prioritarian. The moderate anti-prioritarian favours risk
reductions for people with higher rather than lower survival chances,
which will lead to more unequal distributions of risk. Hence, Keeney’s
theorem to the effect that there is a tension between catastrophe avoidance
and risk equity is illustrated in our analysis.
6.3 Strong and extreme ex ante positions have no ex post correlate
Note in Table 2 that there are no ex post orderings that map onto
ex ante maximax (i.e. extreme anti-prioritarianism) nor onto strong anti-
prioritarianism; nor are there ex post orderings that map onto ex ante
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maximin (i.e. extreme prioritarianism) nor onto strong prioritarianism. What
does this mean? Let us focus on the prioritarianism side.
Think of the ex post omnitarians, who aim to save everyone. This
requires a certain ex ante concern for the plight of the weak – people at
higher fatality chances matter more than people at lower fatality chances.
But how much more?
Clearly not so much more that the analyst’s only concern is the plight
of the person with the lower survival chance. To see this, suppose that
we have two prospects S1 and S2, each containing a person with high
fatality chance and a person with low fatality chance. Let us suppose that
S1 contains a person with a higher fatality chance of .9 and S2 contains a
person with a higher fatality chance of .88.
The ex ante maximiner is so concerned with the plight of the worse
off that she does not even need to know about the person with lower
fatality chance. Her mind is already made up—she ranks S2 over
S1.
However, the omnitarian is not so extreme in her favouring of the
worst off. She ranks prospects in the same way as the moderate prioritarian.
For β = 0 in (5.1) – (5.3) and α = 1 in (3.1) – (3.3), the analyst is indifferent
when the products of the survival chances are equal. She is willing to accept
a decrease in the higher fatality chance, say, from .9 to .88, as long as this
is not at the cost of an excessive increase in the lower fatality chance. For
example, if the lower fatality chance is originally at .4 then it should not
increase above .5.6
Clearly, the ex ante range of positions can go much further than the
ex post range of positions. α = 1 is just a mid-point in the ex ante range of
positions. But β = 0 is the extreme point in the ex post range of positions.
The same reasoning holds mutatis mutandis for the anti-prioritarian at α =
−1 and the unitarian.
6.4 The ex ante minimax and maximax versus the ex post minimax and
maximax
Here is another way of making the same point. Note that for the
omnitarian, U(Si) = min{u1(Si), u2(Si)} for i = 0, 1 and 2: The social utility of
zero people surviving U(S0) is the minimum of {u1(S0) = 0, u2(S0) = 0}, i.e.
0; the social utility of both people surviving U(S2) equals min{u1(S2) = 1,
u2(S2) = 1} = 1; and the social utility of one person surviving U(S1) equals
min{u1(S1) = 0, u2(S1) = 1} = min{u1(S1) = 1, u2(S1) = 0} = 0. So we can
6 Note that in terms of survival chances (1−pi), (.1 ×.6) ≤ (.12× x) for x ≥ .5.
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rewrite the omnitarian value function as:
vβ=0(<p1, p2>) = E[U(Si )] =
∑
i=0,1,2
P(Si )U(Si )(6.4.1)
=
∑
i=0,1,2
P(Si ) min{u1(Si ), u2(Si )}
Similarly for the unitarian U(Si) = max{u1(Si), u2(Si)} for i = 0, 1 and 2. And
so we can rewrite the unitarian value function as:
vβ=0(<p1, p2>) = E[U(Si)] =
∑
i=0,1,2
P(Si ) U(Si )(6.4.2)
=
∑
i=0,1,2
P(Si ) max{u1(Si ), u2(Si )}
Hence the omnitarian position is an ex post maximin position and the
unitarian position is an ex post maximax position. But the ex post maximin or
omnitarian position maps onto moderate prioritarianism and not onto the ex
ante maximin, i.e. extreme prioritarianism. The ex post maximax or unitarian
position maps onto moderate anti-prioritarianism and not onto the ex ante
maximax, i.e. extreme anti-prioritarianism.
6.5 Weak prioritarians versus majoritarians and weak anti-prioritarians
versus minoritarians
What about the positions of the ex ante weak prioritarian and the ex
post majoritarian? How do their orderings compare? To compare their
respective orderings, it is instructive to focus first on the identities in our
table. Note that the following claim holds true, since the contour plots for
α = −1, 0 and 1 are the same as the contour plots for β = 1, .5 and 0,
respectively:
(6.5.1) For all values of α in the set {–1, 0, 1}, there exists a value β, such
that α and β will yield the same ordering over {<p1, p2>|<p1,
p2>∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]}.
Does a similar claim hold for weak prioritarian values of α and majoritarian
values of β? This would be a similar claim:
(6.5.2) For all weak prioritarian values α in the open interval (0, 1), there
exists a majoritarian value β, such that α and β will yield the same
ordering over {<p1, p2>|<p1, p2>∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]}.
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But this claim is false. There does not exist a weak prioritarian of the
form (3.4) who holds the same ordering over {<p1, p2>|<p1, p2>∈ [0, 1]
× [0, 1]} as a majoritarian. Both the weak prioritarian and the majoritarian
are characterized by contour plots that are concave to the origin, but
the contour lines do not overlap. And similarly, there does not exist a
weak anti-prioritarian – with values for α in the open interval (−1, 0)
– who holds the same ordering over {<p1, p2>|<p1, p2>∈ [0, 1] × [0,
1]} as a minoritarian. Both the weak anti-prioritarian and the minoritarian
are characterized by contour plots that are convex to the origin, but the
contour lines do not overlap.
When it comes to implementations of the technology through risk
reductions, clearly ex post analysts that are characterized by the same
contour plots as ex ante analysts will make the same decisions; ex post
analysts who are characterized by similar contour plots (in the sense that
they are convex to the origin or concave to the origin) will make similar
decisions. So our observations regarding the technology in section 4 for
the various ex ante objectives can be repeated here for the matching ex post
objectives.
6.6 Representing the ex post evaluation as a non-additively separable
function of the expected utilities
One could ask if the negative result of the previous subsection – i.e. the
non-overlapping contour plots – is due to the fact that we have adopted
a special functional form in ϕα that is used in the ex ante objectives in
(3.2). Could we find another functional form for the ex ante objectives,
that would establish a correspondence with the (ex post) majoritarian and
minoritarian objectives? In this subsection we show that the answer is
negative. There is a connection here to Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem
(1955). We will see that in our framework of binary utilities the conditions
in Harsanyi’s theorem are much less constraining than in the general
framework.
It is possible to write the ex post evaluation as a function of expected
utilities. By the probability calculus, the chance of exactly one person
surviving is the chance of person 1 surviving plus the chance of
person 2 surviving minus twice the chance of both people surviving,
and so P(S1) = E[u1] + E[u2] − 2 E[u1]E[u2]. Hence, the ex post analyst
maximizes
vβ(<p1, p2>) = β P(S1) + P(S2) = β(E[u1] + E[u2](6.6.1)
− 2 E[u1]E[u2]) + E[u1]E[u2]
So the ex post value function can be written as a function of expected
utilities and hence one could conceive of it as an ex ante objective. But this
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function is not additively separable in E[u1], E[u2], as required in (3.3),
except when β = 0, .5 or 1.
Furthermore, this non-additively separable function can be written
as a weighted average of additive and multiplicative functions of the
expected utilities. The majoritarian objective (0 < β < .5) can be expressed
as a weighted average of additive and multiplicative functions of E[ui],
since (6.6.1) can be written as:
β(E[u1] + E[u2]) + (1 − 2β) E[u1]E[u2](6.6.2)
The minoritarian objective (.5 < β < 1) can be expressed as a weighted
average of additive and multiplicative functions of (1−E[u1]), since (6.6.1)
can also be written as:
1−(1 − β)(1 − E[u1]+1 − E[u2])−(2β − 1)(1 − E[u1])(1 − E[u2])(6.6.3)
However, we may reasonably expect that an ex ante analyst will insist on
additive separability. When we laid out the ex ante position in section 2
we said that how much an ε improvement in, say, person 1’s survival
chance matters to the value of the prospect is determined by person 1’s
level of survival chance. If we stipulate in addition that how much an ε
improvement in person 1’s survival chance matters to the value of the
prospect is determined only by person 1’s level of survival chance – and
not by person 2’s level of survival chance – then we build in additive
separability into the ex ante objectives. It is indeed quite natural to read
this as a conversational implicature in our presentation of the ex ante
objectives.
So, assuming additive separability, one can make the following claim
about the intrapersonal motivations of a single analyst. If she wishes
to construct an ordering that is sensitive to both ex ante and ex post
objectives and that fully respects each of these objectives, then she must
be either (i) both a utilitarian and a paritarian, or (ii) both a moderate
prioritarian and an omnitarian, or (iii) both a moderate anti-prioritarian
and a unitarian. For any other ex ante and ex post positions, one cannot
construct an ordering over {<p1, p2>|<p1, p2>∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]} that
simultaneously respects ex ante and ex post objectives. Of course an analyst
might value both objectives and give weights to each objective to strike
a balance. But this balance will not respect both objectives taken in
isolation.
Similarly, one can make the following claim about interpersonal
agreement between analysts. An ex ante and an ex post analyst can agree
on an ordering just in case (i) the former is a utilitarian and the latter is
a paritarian, (ii) the former is a moderate prioritarian and the latter is an
omnitarian, or (iii) the former is a moderate anti-prioritarian and the latter
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is a unitarian. They have different motivations to back up their positions,
but they agree on an ordering. But if they do not occupy these particular
positions and do not pair up as laid out in (i), (ii) and (iii), then they will
favour different orderings and they will need to compromise if they wish
to strike an agreement.
Some pairs of ex ante and ex post objectives (or analysts) may not fall
into (i), (ii) or (iii), but their preference orderings may nonetheless be quite
close. Say, if one analyst is a mid-range weak prioritarian and the other a
mid-range majoritarian, then their respective preference orderings are both
characterized by contour plots that are slightly convex to the origin. These
preference orderings may be sufficiently close so that (intrapersonal or
interpersonal) compromise may be easily reached, but the initial orderings
do not display exact overlap.
How do our results compare to Harsanyi’s theorem (1955; see also
Broome 1991: 160)? According to this theorem, an evaluation that is (i)
a function of individual expected utilities (i.e. an ex ante objective) and
(ii) can also be represented as the expected value of social utility (i.e. as
an ex post objective) must be linear in individual utilities, i.e. it must be
the utilitarian evaluation (or a weighted variant of it in case a violation of
anonymity is accepted).
What we see here is that in the special case of two-valued utilities, the
two conditions (i) and (ii) in Harsanyi’s theorem put no constraint on the
evaluations because every ex post objective can be written as a function of
individual expected utilities (viz. survival chances). Moreover, even under
the additional constraint that (iii) the ex ante evaluation be an additively
separable function of individual expected utilities, the moderate prioritarian
and moderate anti-prioritarian evaluations remain possible, in addition to
the utilitarian evaluation.
7. CORRELATIONS
So far we have assumed that fatality chances are independent. But this
is not always the case. It may be the case that both people are subject to
positively correlated risks – if one incurs a fatality, then the other one is
more likely to do so as well. Or alternatively, it may be the case that one
person shields the other one from risks – if one person incurs a fatality,
then the other one is less likely to do so. In this case risks are negatively
correlated. How does this affect our analysis?
Correlations or anti-correlations do not affect the ex ante analysis since
vα is a function of the expectations of each person. As long as these
expectations are held fixed, it does not matter whether risks are correlated
or anti-correlated. But it does affect the ex post analysis.
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unitarian omnitarian
r =.3
r = –.3
FIGURE 5. Unitarian and the omnitarian contour plots with positive correlation
(r = .3) and negative correlation (r = −.3). There exists a probability model for
the values of <p1, p2> inside the dashed lines.
The standard way to measure correlations between two variables X and Y
is by means of the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient:
r = Cov(X, Y)√
Var (X)
√
Var (Y)
(7.1)
To calculate joint probabilities as a function of this correlation coefficient
we follow Lucas (1995: 79):
P(S0) = p1 p2 + r
√
p1(1 − p1)p2(1 − p2)(7.2)
P(S1) = p1(1 − p2) + (1 − p1)p2 − 2r
√
p1(1 − p1)p2(1 − p2)(7.3)
P(S2) = (1 − p1)(1 − p2) + r
√
p1(1 − p1)p2(1 − p2)(7.4)
In Figure 5 we have plotted the contour plots for the unitarian and the
omnitarian with positive (r = .3) and negative (r = −.3) correlations. Only
the values of <p1, p2> inside the dotted lines are meaningful. (The values
of <p1, p2> outside these lines do not have a probability model due to the
constraints imposed by r – the image of these values is outside the interval
[0, 1].)
We presented the contour plots for the moderate anti-prioritarian with
independent fatality chances in Figure 2 for α = −1. This contour plot
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is the same as the contour plot for the unitarian with independent
fatality chances, as we showed in the previous section. We now introduce
correlations in the two left figures in Figure 5. For the unitarian, the contour
lines are more convex to the origin when there are positive correlations
and less convex to the origin when there are negative correlations than
in the contour plot in Figure 2 for α = −1, in which fatality chances
are independent. Similarly, for the omnitarian, the contour lines are more
concave to the origin when there are positive correlations and less concave
to the origin when there are negative correlations in comparison to
independence between fatality chances than in the contour plot in Figure
2 for α = 1.
Can we get an intuitive feel for these results? We will restrict ourselves
here to the case of omnitarians and positive correlations – the other cases
can be explained in a similar vein. Omnitarians, like moderate prioritarians,
favour people with lower survival chances. Now if we introduce positive
correlations, then it becomes more likely that there are joint survivals –
which is all omnitarians care about. If it becomes easier to secure joint
survivals, then they will be even more intent on favouring people with
lower survival chances. And this is precisely what increased concavity to
the origin means.
8. AN n-PERSON MODEL
The results that we have obtained for two people also hold for n people,
mutatis mutandis. The moderate prioritarian and the omnitarian (who cares
only that all n survive) stand by the same ordering; similarly for the
moderate anti-prioritarian and the unitarian (who cares only that at least one
of the n survive); and for the utilitarian and the paritarian (with U(S0) = 0;
U(S1) = 1/n; U(S2) = 2/n; . . .; U(S3) = 1).
But extending the problem to n people does open up an additional
entry in the ex post continuum, viz. what if our objective is not that at least
one or all survive, but rather that at least j people survive for 1 < j < n?
Let us call this the (ex post) strategist position. We chose this term because a
military strategist might act on the knowledge that she can win the battle
if at least j of the n troops would still be standing.
Let us analyse this case for n = 3. For j = 2, we have utility assignments
U(S0) = U(S1) = 0 and U(S2) = U(S3) = 1 with Si being a state of the world
with i people surviving. So we calculate the value of the public works for
the ex post strategist as before:
(8.1) v(<p1, p2, p3>) = E[U(Si )] =
∑
i=0,...,3
P(Si )U(Si )
= P(S2) + P(S3)
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Assuming independence between fatality events:
P(S2) = p1(1 − p2)(1 − p3) + (1 − p1)p2(1 − p3) + (1 − p1)(1 − p2)p3(8.2)
P(S3) = (1 − p1)(1 − p2)(1 − p3)(8.3)
We construct a contour plot for the ex post strategist in 3D space (Figure 6).
Both the strategist and the paritarian occupy an intermediate position
between the unitarian (with contour planes concave to the origin) and the
omnitarian (with contour planes convex to the origin). For the paritarian
the contour planes are flat. (The graph is omitted since they are simply
3D versions of the 2D version represented in Figure 2 with α = 0.) But
the strategist occupies a different intermediate position. Her position is
characterized by contour planes that are convex to the origin at low
fatality chances, relatively flat at mid-level fatality chances, and concave
to the origin at high fatality chances. Note also that there is no ex ante
objective that yields the same ordering as the strategist.
This has interesting consequences for decisions about implementing
the technology. The recommendations for unitarians, paritarians and
omnitarians are the same as in the two person case. However, the case
of the strategist is novel. At low-level fatality chances, contour planes are
convex to the origin and hence the analyst will make technology choices
in the same way as the unitarian, i.e. choose corner solutions favouring
people with lower fatality chances. At mid-range fatality chances, contour
planes are relatively flat and hence the analyst will make technology
choices in the same way as the paritarian, i.e. choose the corner solution
that maximally reduces fatality chances. At high-level fatality chances,
contour planes are concave to the origin and hence the analyst will make
technology choices in the same way as the omnitarian, i.e. she will typically
choose interior solutions favouring people with higher fatality chances.
For the strategist, the mathematical analysis yields results that exceed
our intuitive grasp. What can be said is that the strategist, just like
the paritarian, is a step on the ex post continuum from the unitarian
to the omnitarian. The paritarian with flat contour planes occupies
one intermediate position between unitarian convexity and omnitarian
concavity to the origin. The strategist occupies another intermediate
position with convexity to the origin at low-level fatality chances, relative
flatness at mid-range fatality chances and concavity to the origin at high-
level fatality chances.
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p1
p2
p3
FIGURE 6. Contour plot for the ex post strategist.
9. PRO-POORLY OFF EVALUATIONS
9.1 Concerns for the poorly off
Our problem is a special case of the problem of the evaluation of prospects
in general which has been extensively discussed. It is special in that we
restricted ourselves to a framework of two-valued utilities. Let us look
at the general framework and lift the restriction of two-valued utilities.
Consider the prospects in Table 3 and Table 4. Table 3 presents a prospect
that is uncertain and contains inequalities. Table 4 presents a prospect that
is both certain and equal.
A variant of Harsanyi’s theorem (1955) (see subsection 6.6 above)
provides an axiomatic justification for the evaluation of prospects by
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Lu&u 
State 1 
p  .3
 
State 2 
(1– p )  .7
 
Person 1 2 .1 
Person 2 .2 .4 
TABLE 3. An uncertain and unequal prospect
Lc&e
 
p  1 
Person 1 .5 
Person 2 .5 
TABLE 4. A certain and equal prospect
means of a value function that takes the sum of people’s expected utilities.
So the value of a prospect L is
(9.1.1) vU(L) =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=i
p j ui j for persons i = 1, . . . , n and
states j = 1, . . . , m and ui j is person i ′s utility if state j actualizes.
This is the utilitarian value function. We order prospects as follows:
L∗ L# ⇔ vU(L∗) ≥ vU(L#)(9.1.2)
On this utilitarian ordering, Lu&u Lc&e, since vU(Lu&u) = ((.3×2)+
(.7×.1)) + ((.3×.2) + (.7×.4)) = 1.01 > 1 = .5 + .5 = vU(Lc&e).
But now suppose that some analyst would voice the following
objection: ‘Granted, I see the value of prospect Lu&u: person 1 has a
relatively small chance of ending up at a high level of utility. But person
2 is bound to do worse than she would in prospect Lc&e and person 1 has
a relatively large chance of ending up substantially worse than she would
in prospect Lc&e. On balance, I prefer Lc&e to Lu&u.’
This does not seem an unreasonable position. The challenge is to
spell out a calculus that would support this alternative ordering. We will
present three value functions that are prominent in the literature and
that support this alternative ordering. All these value functions could
be interpreted as attempts to capture concerns for the poorly off in the
evaluation of prospects.
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Our ex ante model with α > 0 is a special case of one of these value
functions as applied to our special framework with binary utilities. Our
ex post model with β < .5 is a special case of another one of these value
functions as applied to our special framework with binary utilities. And
the third value function is problematic because it fails to capture any
concern for the poorly off when we restrict ourselves to the framework
of binary utilities.
We will call the orderings based on these value-functions ‘pro-poorly off
evaluations’. These evaluations are sometimes presented as contesting in-
terpretations of what moral philosophers call ‘prioritarianism’ following
Parfit’s ‘Priority View’ (1991). Now we could follow this terminology, but
then we would need to distinguish between this sense of ‘prioritarianism’
and the more narrow sense of ‘prioritarianism’ as one side of the
continuum of ex ante evaluations, as defined above. To avoid confusion,
we will talk about pro-poorly off evaluations instead.
9.2 Diamond’s, Rabinowicz’s and Fleurbaey’s pro-poorly off value
functions
Pro-poorly off analysts may calculate the expected utility for each person,
construct a strictly concave ϕ transform of this expectation and sum these
ϕ transforms. This value function is commonly ascribed to Diamond
(1967)7:
(9.2.1) vD(L) =
n∑
i=1
ϕ
⎛
⎝ m∑
j=i
p j ui j
⎞
⎠ for persons i = 1, . . . , n and
states j = 1, . . . , m and ϕ is a strictly concave function.
According to Rabinowicz, pro-poorly off analysts should construct a strictly
concave ϕ transform of each utility value uij, sum these transforms within
each state to determine the social utility of the state and then construct the
expectation of the social utility of a state. So, for Rabinowicz,
(9.2.2) vR(L) =
m∑
j=1
p j
n∑
i=i
ϕ (ui j ) for persons i = 1, . . . , n and
states j = 1, . . . , m and ϕ is a strictly concave function.
According to Fleurbaey, pro-poorly off analysts should construct a strictly
concave transform ϕ of each utility value uij, calculate the average value
7 Diamond (1967) actually does not lay out this value function. He offers two prospects
that are structurally analogous to the prospects in Table 6 and objects that Harsanyi’s
social welfare function assigns equal value to them. The value function vD(L) is commonly
attributed to Diamond (1967), because it does indeed assign greater value to one of the
prospects in Table 6 than to the other, as we will see below. A statement of the social welfare
function in (9.2.1) can be found in McCarthy (2006: 339) and Adler and Sanchirico (2006:
306).
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 Lu&u Lc&e  
vD ((.3(2)+.7(.1))) + ((.3(.2)+.7(.4))  1.40 .5+.5  1.41 Lc&e  Lu&u 
vR .3(2+.2) + .7(.1+.4) 1.22 .5+.5  1.41 Lc&e  Lu&u 
vF .3((2+.2)/2)2 + .7((.1+.4)/2)2 .42 ((.5+.5)/2)2  .5 Lc&e  Lu&u 
TABLE 5. Comparing Lu&u and Lc&e on Diamond’s, Rabinowicz’s and
Fleurbaey’s value functions
of these transforms within each state, and construct the inverse transform
ϕ−1 of these averages. This is the equally distributed equivalent (following
Kolm 1968; Atkinson 1970: 250) of the state which is a measure of the value
of the state. They then construct the expectation of the equally distributed
equivalent. So, for Fleurbaey,
(9.2.3) vF (L) =
m∑
j=1
p jϕ−1
((
n∑
i=i
ϕ(ui j )
)
/n
)
for persons i = 1, . . . , n
and states j = 1, . . . , m and ϕ is a strictly concave function.
Let us explain the role of the equally distributed equivalent of a state. Take
a state with distribution of utility 25 for person 1 and utility 9 for person
2. Then the equally distributed equivalent is the utility value which is such
that the analyst would be indifferent between a state with person 1 at 25
and person 2 at 9 and a state in which every person has the utility of
the equally distributed equivalent. So suppose that the ϕ transform is the
square root function (which is a strictly concave transform) and hence ϕ−1
is the square function. Then the equally distributed equivalent equals ((
√
25
+
√
9)/2)2 = 16. So the analyst is indifferent between a state in which one
person is at 25 and the other is at 9 on the one hand and a state in which
both are at 16. (A utilitarian, on the other hand, is indifferent between the
former state and a state in which both people are at average utility, i.e.
at 17.)
Notice that all of these proposals with the square root as the ϕ
transform provide us with the desired result, i.e. they overturn the
utilitarian ordering Lu&u Lc&e – as Table 5 shows.
But of course vD, vR and vF do not provide us with the same orderings
over all sets of prospects. Much can be said about the desirability of
these contesting conceptions, but we will not enter this debate here. A
discussion can be found in Adler and Sanchirico (2006) and Fleurbaey
(2010: 649–652). We are interested in how these different pro-poorly off
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suicide 
mission 
Lsm 
 
State 1
p
State 2
(1−p) 
Person 1 0 0 
Person 2 1 1 
 
 
  
drawing 
straws 
Lds  
State 1 
p 
State 2 
(1−p) 
Person 1 0 1 
Person 2 1 0 
 
 
vD(L
sm
)  0  1  1 < vD(Lds)  (1 − p) + p  
vR(Lsm)  p1 + (1 − p)1  1  vR(Lds)  p1 + (1− p)1  1 
vF(Lsm)   
p((1)/2)2 + (1 − p)((1)/2)2  1/4 
 vF(Lds)   
p((1)/2)2 + (1 − p)((1)/2)2  1/4 
TABLE 6. Suicide mission and drawing straws with 0 < p < 1
evaluations play out within our restricted framework of two-valued
utilities.
9.3 Two concerns for the poorly off
There are two concerns for the poorly off in our framework and we wish
to investigate how these concerns fare on vD, vR and vF.
The first concern relates to the observation that an analyst is typically
more tolerant towards distributed risk than towards focused risk. She may
take some risks and be tolerant of an expected fatality count greater than
1 but she does not like to send a single person into certain death. One
could interpret this as a concern for the poorly off – the analyst abhors the
focused risk of sending someone into certain death. This kind of concern
is captured by the prospects in Table 6. Even if someone is bound to die,
one might think that it is better if the analyst determines that straws be
drawn rather than that she designates who will go on a suicide mission.
By doing so the risk is distributed rather than focused.
The second concern is the concern that misery loves company. An
analyst may not like it that states actualize in which some people flourish
and others do not. Consider the following three prospects. Person 1
and person 2 may both have an equal chance of dying kept constant
across all prospects. But on prospect 1, the risks are fully correlated; on
prospect 2, they are independent; and on prospect 3, the risks are fully
anti-correlated. In Table 7, we present these prospects with the risk to
each person set at .5. On a ‘misery loves company’ understanding of our
concern for the poorly off, it is better to be subjected to correlated risk
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 Lcor 
 
P(S1) 
.5 
P(S2) 
.5 
P1 1 0 
P2 1 0 
  Lind P(S1) 
.25 
P(S2) 
.25 
P(S3) 
.25 
P(S4) 
.25 
P1 0 1 0 1 
P2 0 0 1 1 
 
  Lac P(S1) 
.5 
P(S2) 
.5 
P1 0 1 
P2 1 0 
vD(Lcor )  5 + .5 = vD(L ind)  .5 + .5 = vD(Lac)  .5 + .5 
vR(Lcor)  
.5(21) + .5(20)  1 
= vR(Lind)   
.25(20) + .5(1) + .25(21)  1
= vR(Lac)  
.5(1) + .5(1)  1 
vF(Lcor)   
.5(1)2 + .5(0) 2   1/2 
> vF(Lind) =  
.25(0)2  .5((1)/2)2 + .25(1)2  3/8 
> vF(Lac)  
.5((1)/2)2+.5((1)/2)2
 1/4 
TABLE 7. Correlated risk, independent risk and anti-correlated risk
than to independent risk and it is better to be subjected to independent
risk than to anti-correlated risk.
Notice the equalities and inequalities in Tables 6 and 7. vD captures
the first type of concern for the poorly off, vF captures the second type
of concern, but vR captures neither. Hence, in a framework with binary
variables, Rabinowicz’s approach cannot capture a concern for the poorly
off neither in the sense of steering clear from focused risk, nor in the sense
of steering clear from solitary misery.
Rabinowicz’s response (in personal communication) is that he simply
does not wish to capture such concerns. He only wishes to capture what he
takes to be Parfit’s notion of prioritarianism, viz. that ε-changes in utilities
should count for more at a lower rather than at a higher level. And since
expressing such comparisons involves more than two utility values, it is
no wonder that his value function does not capture any pro-poorly off
concerns in a framework of binary utilities.
Our concern is broader. We wish to capture concerns for the poorly off
of any kind that are not captured by the utilitarian value function. There
clearly are such concerns in a framework of binary utilities.
9.4 Our ex ante and ex post evaluations compared with Diamond’s and
Fleurbaey’s value functions
Our ex ante evaluation for α > 0 in (3.2)–(3.4) is a particular instantiation of
vD. We impose a particular family of ϕ transforms on the expected utility
of each person. Our choice of this family is motivated by the fact that
by manipulating a single parameter we can slide from utilitarianism via
prioritarianism to the ex ante maximin and on the route we can capture the
moderate prioritarian, whose ordering coincides with the omnitarian.
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Our ex post evaluation for β < .5 can be interpreted as a particular
instantiation of vF. Define the following strictly concave ϕ transform with
parameter γ :
ϕγ (x) = x1/(γ+1) for 0 < γ ≤ ∞ and undefined otherwise.(9.4.1)
And so ϕγ −1(x) = x(γ+1). The concavity of the function increases with
greater values of γ expressing greater concern for the poorly off.
As in section 5, we distinguish between three types of states, viz. states
in which nobody survives (S0), states in which one person survives (S1)
and states in which both survive (S2). The equally distributed equivalent in
S0 is clearly 0 and in S2 is clearly 1. In S1 the equally distributed equivalent
is
ϕ−1γ ((ϕγ (0) + ϕγ (1))/2) = ϕ−1γ (.5)(9.4.2)
We can now define vF within our two-person framework:
(9.4.3) vF (L) = 0P(S0) + ϕ−1γ (.5)P(S1) + 1P(S2)
= ϕ−1γ (.5)P(S1) + P(S2)
Notice that ϕγ −1(.5) is a monotonically decreasing function of γ from
domain [0, ∞] to range [0, .5]. Now compare (9.4.3) with (5.1): vF(L) equals
vβ(<p1, p2>) if we equate ϕγ −1(.5) in the former with β in the latter. In
other words, the γ -value which expresses the concern for the poorly off
within Fleurbaey’s pro-poorly off value function, maps onto our β value,
which expresses the majoritarian concern within our special framework.
This formal result has an intuitive interpretation. The majoritarian
concern can indeed be interpreted in the same style as Fleurbaey’s concern
for the poorly off: To set β low in vβ(<p1, p2>) is to be strongly concerned
that not just one but both people live; To set γ high in vF(L) is to be strongly
concerned about the unsaved life in the presence of the saved life. Both
concerns are tantamount.
9.5 Suicide mission and drawing straws
How do our ex ante value function vα and our ex post value function vβ
fare with suicide mission and drawing straws?
Our ex ante approach is an extension of the vD from the prioritarian
orderings into the anti-prioritarian orderings for binary utility values. For
suicide mission,
vα(<p1 = 1, p2 = 0>) =
∑
i=1,2
ϕα(E[ui ]) = ϕα(0) + ϕα(1).(9.5.1)
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For drawing straws,
vα(<p1 = p, p2 = (1 − p)>) = ϕα(1 − p) + ϕα(p).(9.5.2)
It is easy to verify that
vα(<p1 = p, p2 = (1 − p)>) ≥ vα(<p1 = 1, p2 = 0>) ⇔ α ≥ 0.(9.5.3)
Hence prioritarians prefer drawing straws, anti-prioritarians prefer suicide
mission, and utilitarians are indifferent.
Our ex post approach cannot distinguish between suicidemission and
drawing straws. In either case, one person will be left standing. So the
vβ will simply equal β, i.e. the value of one person surviving. And this
coincides with Fleurbaey’s approach on which vF(Lsm) = vF(Lds), i.e. the
equally distributed equivalent of one person left standing.
This result maps onto our presentation in section 7. Notice that we
have perfect anti-correlation between fatality chances in both suicide
mission and drawing straws and so r = −1. In the lower graphs in
Figure 5, the area between the dashed lines will, for r = −1, shrink to a
single contour line, viz. the northwest-southeast diagonal containing all
values of <p1 = p, p2 = (1−p)> for all probability values p. And this is the
case in the omnitarian (left), the paritarian (not represented), and unitarian
(right) contour plots. Hence <p1 = 1, p2 = 0> (suicide mission) and <p1 =
p, p2 = (1−p)> (drawing straws) are on the same contour line in any ex post
evaluation.
9.6 Correlated risk, independent risk and anti-correlated risk
How does our ex ante approach and ex post approach fare with correlated
risk Lcor, independent risk Lind and anti-correlated risk Lar?
Like the pro-poorly off value function vD, our ex ante approach does not
make any distinctions for prioritarian, utilitarian or anti-prioritarian values
of α. In each case, the ex ante evaluation is vα(<p1 = .5, p2 = .5>) since each
person’s expectation E[ui] is precisely the same.
On our ex post approach, vβ = .5 for Lcor (since there is a .5 chance of
two people standing), vβ = .25 + .5β for Lind (since there is .25 chance of
two people standing and a .5 chance of one person standing) and vβ = β
for Lac (since there is a certainty of one person standing). Hence like the
pro-poorly-off value function vF, our ex ante approach ranks Lcor  Lind  Lac
for omnitarian and majoritarian values of β < .5. Furthermore, for paritarians
(i.e. for β = .5), Lcor ∼ Lind ∼ Lac; and for minoritarians and unitarians (i.e.
for β > .5), Lac  Lind  Lcor.
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9.7 Ex post evaluations and the principle of personal good.
It is well-known that ex post evaluations do not respect the principle of
personal good. The principle of personal good says that if every person’s
expectation is at least as good in one prospect as in another and at least one
person’s expectation is better, then the former prospect is better than the
latter. Here is a case in which an ex post evaluation violates the principle
of personal good. Take drawing straws in Table 7 and set p at .5. Then
each person’s expected utility is .5. Now suppose that we give each person
.5−ε for sure for small ε. (Note that we bring in a third utility value.) Then
the expectation of both people is greater in drawing straws than in the
sure prospect and so, by the principle of personal good, drawing straws
is better than the sure prospect. But an analyst using the ex post value
function vF will be averse to the distribution in drawing straws and rank
the sure prospect over drawing straws.
Can we have the same phenomenon in life or death prospects (i.e.
within the framework of binary utilities) with independent risks? The
answer is no: Within our framework with binary utilities and on the
assumption of independent risks, ex post evaluations always respect the
principle of personal good. To see this in the two-person case, consider
the ex post value function in (5.1) with independent chances set as in (5.2)
and (5.3). Now take the derivatives of this value function toward the
expectations, i.e. toward the survival chances (1−pi) for i = 1, 2. These
derivatives equal (1−β)(1−pj) + βpj for j = 1, 2 and i = j. Note that
these derivatives are always non-negative for the admissible values of the
parameters. Hence the ex post value function is a non-decreasing function
of the individual expectations ceteris paribus. Hence, it cannot be the case
that one person’s expectation is raised ceteris paribus in prospect L# relative
to L∗ and yet the ex post value function would come to rank L∗ over L#. (The
same holds when the number of people n > 2.)
10. SUMMARY
In ordering life or death prospects, there are two grand distinctions.
First, do we base our judgement on the expected survival chances of the
participants (ex ante) or on the chance that at least a particular fraction of
the population will survive (ex post)? Second, are we soft-hearted or hard-
hearted about the matter? Soft-hearted ex ante analysts have a soft spot for
participants at high fatality risk. Soft-hearted ex post analysts are willing to
take chances so that all (or most) participants may survive. Hard-hearted
ex ante analysts favour participants at low fatality risk. Hard-hearted ex
post analysts are willing to sacrifice people so as to avoid catastrophes, i.e.
situations in which nobody (or only few) would survive.
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We have laid out a range of ex ante and ex post evaluations that range
from soft-heartedness to hard-heartedness and the aim to minimize the
expected loss of human lives is a mid-point on both of these continua. To
conclude, we list the following 12 findings:
1. There is a range of ex post evaluations and a range of ex ante
evaluations with additively separable value functions that yield
roughly parallel orderings. Contour plots display concavity towards
the origin for soft-heartedness and convexity towards the origin for
hard-heartedness.
2. However, ex ante evaluations can go to extremes of soft-
heartedness (maximin) and hard-heartedness (maximax) whereas ex
post evaluations cannot.
3. Ex post evaluations and ex ante evaluations with additively separable
functions agree on precisely the same orderings if and only if (i) the ex
post aim is to save at least one (unitarian), in which case it coincides
with the moderate anti-prioritarian value function; (ii) the ex post aim
is to save all (omnitarian), in which case it coincides with the moderate
prioritarian value function; or (iii) we attribute equal value to each life
saved (paritarian) in which case it coincides with the utilitarian value
function.
4. Within the more restrictive framework of binary utilities, the
conditions in Harsanyi’s theorem put no constraints on the set
of permissible evaluations since every ex post value function can
be written in terms of an ex ante value function of individual
expectations. If we add the constraint that ex ante value functions
should be additively separable, it still leaves room for moderate
prioritarian and moderate anti-prioritarian evaluations, aside from the
utilitarian evaluation.
5. There are multiple continua from soft-heartedness to hard-
heartedness. We have spelled out three – one over the ex ante route
and two over the ex post route. Continua over the ex post route pass
via the paritarian objective or via the strategist objective – i.e. aiming
to save at least m out of the n people for 1 < m < n. These continua
all yield different orderings.
6. The strategist objective for n = 3 resembles the unitarian ordering
at low-level fatality chances, the paritarian ordering on mid-level
fatality chances, and the omnitarian ordering at high-level fatality
chances.
7. As to technology choices, the utilitarian objective to minimize
expected fatalities focuses risk reductions on the person who
can receive the greatest reduction in her fatality chance. Unless
possible risk reductions are equal for both people, this will lead
to a corner solution (i.e. an allocation benefitting a single person).
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Hard-heartedness yields corner solutions favouring people at low
risk. With soft-heartedness the possibility of interior solutions (i.e.
allocations benefiting multiple people) opens up – these allocations
are slanted towards favouring people at high risk.
8. Positive correlations between fatality chances affect ex post orderings.
They yield orderings that map onto orderings for more extreme
positions – i.e. the omnitarian ordering tends toward the ex ante
maximin and the unitarian ordering tends towards the ex ante maximax
ordering; negative correlations between fatality chances yield ex post
orderings that tend towards the utilitarian ordering.
9. Within our framework with binary utilities, Rabinowicz’s pro-poorly
off value function is not sensitive to a concern for the poorly off,
neither as a concern for focused (i.e. undistributed) risk nor as
a concern for solitary misery. It simply reduces to a utilitarian
evaluation.
10. Our ex ante prioritarian evaluation is an instance of Diamond’s pro-
poorly off value function. As such it is sensitive to the poorly off in that
it is concerned about focused risk (but not about solitary misery).
11. Our ex post majoritarian and omnitarian evaluations are instances of
Fleurbaey’s pro-poorly off value function. As such they are sensitive to
the poorly off in that these evaluations are concerned about solitary
misery (but not about focused risk).
12. Within our framework of binary utilities and assuming independent
risk, the ex post evaluation respects the principle of personal good,
unlike in the general framework.
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